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One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward:  
An Elastic Products Liability Framework 
for E-Cigarette Regulation 
EVAN ROBINSON* 
Societal innovation is frequently triggered by need. Year 
after year, novel technologies are created by entrepreneurs 
who seek to find a more effective, efficient, or less dangerous 
way of accomplishing a specific goal. Oftentimes, these new 
technologies enter the marketplace bringing with them a 
host of uncertainties concerning both their performance and 
effect on consumer activity. Despite these inevitable uncer-
tainties, new technologies play a vital role in advancing so-
ciety when appropriately controlled. Indeed, while the ap-
propriate levels of control may vary across industries and 
technologies, one principal remains constant amongst them 
all: the obligation to balance risk with reward.  
The need for such a delicate balancing act is no more 
evident than in the case of e-cigarettes and vaporizer prod-
ucts. Over the last two decades, innovators and entrepre-
neurs alike have sought to develop healthier solutions aimed 
at reducing the overwhelming number of fatalities and life-
threatening illnesses associated with one of America’s most 
prevalent killers, the consumption of traditional tobacco cig-
arettes. While the undeniable benefits of these innovations 
have been formally acknowledged by both the FDA and Con-
gress, the current federal regulatory framework that 
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controls their availability to consumers operates as a hin-
drance to innovation and industry growth rather than an ef-
fective means of protecting the public’s health.  
This Note sets out to analyze the turbulent rise and fall 
of government and consumer sentiment surrounding these 
products and evaluates the effectiveness of the current FDA 
regulatory framework, which functions to constrain the dif-
fusion of what may be one of the next substantial public 
health benefits. Specifically, this Note explores the potential 
for a more effective and elastic regulatory framework which 
incorporates the dual use of federal and state regulatory 
measures to strike an optimal middle ground position be-
tween minimizing uncertain public health risks while simul-
taneously not discouraging innovation and industry growth. 
In the final analysis, officials tasked with developing suffi-
cient regulatory measures should seek to take calculated 
risks in the interests of promoting innovation. After all, it 
should come as no surprise that the most promising techno-
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INTRODUCTION 
The “leading cause of preventable death” in the United States is 
attributable to the consumption of traditional tobacco cigarettes.1 
Shockingly, nearly 500,000 people in the United States die each year 
as a result of cigarette-related illnesses.2 “This is about one in five 
deaths annually, or 1,300 deaths every day.”3 That said, after making 
strides to reduce cigarette consumption, and thus minimizing their 
associated medical ramifications, society is once again faced with 
the task of combating yet another slew of tobacco-related illnesses.4 
Although this task, a true 21st-century problem, arises in the tech-
nological age and concerns uncertain health risks associated with the 
use of e-cigarettes and vaporizers. E-cigarettes and vaporizer de-
vices, also known as “electronic nicotine delivery systems” 
(“ENDS”), were developed with the primary intention of providing 
a more safe and effective way of assisting traditional cigarette smok-
ers in their efforts to kick a deadly habit.5 What was once thought to 
be an innovative technological advancement aimed at improving so-
cietal health, however, has begun to rear its ugly head as a potential 
Loch Ness monster of sorts imposing, in some cases, fatal conse-
quences for its users.6 As the volume of injuries increases day by 
day, researchers, scientists, and even the United States government 
remain unsure as to the precise cause of these recent fatalities and 
serious lung injuries affecting users of e-cigarette and vaporizer de-
vices.7 
 
 1 Smoking & Tobacco Use: Fast Facts, CDC (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/fast_facts/index.htm. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Cigarette Smoking Among U.S. Adults Lowest Ever Recorded: 14% in 
2017, CDC (Nov. 8, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.cdc.gov/media/re-
leases/2018/p1108-cigarette-smoking-adults.html. 
 5 U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., E-CIGARETTE USE AMONG YOUTH 
AND YOUNG ADULTS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, CDC 1, 8, 10, 201 
(2016), https://e-cigarettes.surgeongeneral.gov/documents/2016_SGR_Full_
Report_non-508.pdf. 
 6 See Hannah Knowles & Lena H. Sun, What We Know About the Mysterious 
Vaping-Linked Illnesses and Deaths, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2020, 3:11 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2019/09/07/what-we-know-about-mys-
terious-vaping-linked-illnesses-deaths/. 
 7 See id. 
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Sudden and serious medical illnesses arising in various users of 
e-cigarette and vaporizer products has motivated the federal govern-
ment to respond through the enforcement of regulatory measures 
created to prevent individuals from exposure to potentially danger-
ous tobacco-related products.8 The federal government’s regulatory 
response, however, enforced in the wake of serious but uncertain 
dangers, is likely to impose significant impediments to the innova-
tion of healthier alternative tobacco products created for the primary 
purpose of deterring individuals from smoking lethal cigarettes.9 As 
a result, this problem presents interesting questions concerning the 
federal government’s regulatory approach in protecting the public 
health of its citizens from products that may possess uncertain dan-
gers in addition to potentially significant public health benefits.10 
Accordingly, this Note will investigate these issues and, in doing so, 
seek to analyze a flexible regulatory framework most effective for 
dealing with these types of products. 
This Note first begins in Part I by examining the historical rise 
of vaporizer and e-cigarette devices. Part I then summarizes the 
main arguments and rationales of public health officials who support 
a softer approach to the regulation of these devices, in addition to 
those who favor a strict approach to regulation. With these regula-
tory rationales in hand, Part II explains the recent news surrounding 
the nationwide outbreaks of vaping-related injuries. It further pro-
vides statistical data concerning the outbreaks, in addition to the 
conclusions drawn by the CDC as to the primary cause of those out-
breaks. Next, Part III reviews the historical progression of United 
States tobacco regulation, focusing on FDA regulatory measures de-
signed to regulate traditional cigarettes. Part III then goes on to an-
alyze the significant impediments to the growth and longevity of the 
e-cigarette and vaporizer industries as a result of the FDA’s prom-
ulgation of the Deeming Rule, which seeks to regulate these devices 
under the same framework currently utilized for traditional tobacco 
 
 8 See id. 
 9 See Jonathan H. Adler, Why FDA Regulations Limiting E-Cigarette Mar-
keting May Cost Lives and Violate the Constitution, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2017 
at 8:06 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspir-
acy/wp/2017/12/12/why-fda-regulations-limiting-e-cigarette-marketing-may-
cost-lives-and-violate-the-constitution/. 
 10 See id. 
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cigarettes. After analyzing the challenges underlying the current 
FDA regulatory regime, Part IV begins by explaining the need for a 
more flexible regulatory approach that is capable of building in ad-
justment as the facts change. Specifically, Part IV proposes the im-
plementation of certain federal regulatory measures to be coupled 
with the use of state tort law as a means of providing an elastic reg-
ulatory framework best suited to manage products that may possess 
uncertain dangers but which may also have significant public health 
benefits. 
I. THE RISE OF VAPORIZER AND E-CIGARETTE TECHNOLOGY 
As the demand for solutions to reduce the consumption of tradi-
tional cigarettes increased, Herbert Gilbert was successful in acquir-
ing a patent for the first “smokeless nontobacco cigarette” in 1965.11 
By 2004, the device gained significant popularity among Chinese 
smokers “as a potential cessation device or an alternative cigarette 
product” and was later introduced into the U.S. market by the mid-
2000s.12 Today, e-cigarettes are electronically powered devices, 
which “operate by heating a liquid solution to a high enough tem-
perature so that it produces an aerosol [vapor] that is inhaled.”13 The 
vapor ingested by the user is comprised mainly of concentrated 
amounts of nicotine, chemical flavoring, and various additional 
chemicals “such as glycol, to retain moisture and create the aerosol 
when heated.”14 Since their inception, e-cigarettes have caused a 
threatening disruption to the traditional cigarette market as studies 
have shown that “cigarette smokers [are] 28 percent more likely to 
 
 11 U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note, 5, at 10; T.R. Goldman, 
E-Cigarettes and Federal Regulation, HEALTH AFFAIRS (July 18, 2014), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20140718.423628/full/; see Lauren 
H. Greenberg, The “Deeming Rule”: The FDA’s Destruction of the Vaping In-
dustry, 83 BROOKLYN L. REV. 777, 783 (2017). 
 12 See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 5, at 10. 
 13 E-Cigarettes: Facts, Stats and Regulations, TRUTH INITIATIVE (Nov. 11, 
2019), https://truthinitiative.org/research-resources/emerging-tobacco-prod-
ucts/e-cigarettes-facts-stats-and-regulations. 
 14 Id.; see Erin Coleman, Health Risks of Vaping: What You Need to Know, 
BENEFITS BRIDGE UNITED CONCORDIA DENTAL (Jul. 6, 2018), https://benefits-
bridge.unitedconcordia.com/health-risks-of-vaping-what-you-need-to-know/. 
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stop smoking if they use[] e-cigarettes.”15 Further, the majority of 
adult e-cigarette users are comprised of former or current traditional 
cigarette smokers.16 By 2018, the global e-cigarette and vaporizer 
industry was valued at roughly $14.05 billion.17 This was a major 
increase from 2017, when the global industry was valued at $9.39 
billion.18 Moreover, some analysts project that by 2026 the market 
could reach upwards of $58 billion.19 Perhaps one of the main rea-
sons for the significant and rapid growth of the e-cigarette and va-
porizer industry relative to other Nicotine Replacement Therapies 
(“NRTs”) is because, unlike other NRTs, e-cigarettes and vaporizers 
imitate the act of smoking, thus having “both pharmacologic and 
behavioral components of [traditional] cigarette addiction.”20 
 
 15 ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & SIDDHARTHA ANEJA, THE IMPACT OF ELECTRONIC 
CIGARETTES ON CIGARETTE SMOKING BY AMERICANS AND ITS HEALTH AND 
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS P22 (2019), https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/08/ECigaretteStudy.pdf; Jonathan H. Adler et al., Baptists, 
Bootleggers & Electronic Cigarettes, 33 YALE J. REG. 313, 334 (2016) (discuss-
ing e-cigarettes threatening disruption). 
 16 Electronic Cigarettes: What’s The Bottom Line, CDC, 
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-cigarettes/pdfs/Electronic-
Cigarettes-Infographic-508.pdf; see Deeming Tobacco Products to Be Subject to 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act; Restrictions on the Sale and Distribution of 
Tobacco Products and Required Warning Statements for Tobacco Products, 81 
Fed. Reg. 28974, 29036 (May 10, 2016) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 110; 1140; 
1143) [hereinafter Deeming Rule]; Jonathan H. Adler, Regulatory Obstacles to 
Harm Reduction: The Case of Smoking, N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 712, 722 (2017) 
[hereinafter Regulatory Obstacles to Harm Reduction]. 
 17 See Vaping Market to Reach a Value $29.39 Billion at a CAGR of 20.3% 




 18 See Global Electronic Cigarette Market Outlook Report 2017 – 2019 & 
2026, PRNEWSWIRE (Sept. 2, 2019, 1:30 PM), https://www.prnewswire.com/
news-releases/global-electronic-cigarette-market-outlook-report-2017-2019--
2026-300910267.html. 
 19 See id. 
 20 Regulatory Obstacles to Harm Reduction, supra note 16, at 722–23 (citing 
Zachary Cahn & Michael Siegel, Electronic Cigarettes as a Harm Reduction 
Strategy for Tobacco Control: A Step Forward or a Repeat of Past Mistakes?, 32 
J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y. 16, 17 (2011)); see Caroline Franck et. al, Electronic 
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Supporters of e-cigarette and vaporizer products advocate that 
these devices may provide a safer nicotine alternative for individuals 
addicted to smoking traditional cigarettes.21 Various studies focus-
ing on the health risks associated with e-cigarette consumption have 
bolstered this argument. For example, the National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (the “NAS”) recently released 
a study, “mandated by Congress,” in which researchers concluded 
that “switching to e-cigarettes reduces the exposure to many toxins 
and cancer-causing substances in regular cigarettes.”22 Moreover, 
the FDA has agreed with these findings stating that, “the inhalation 
of nicotine (e.g., nicotine without the products of combustion) is of 
less risk to the user than the inhalation of nicotine delivered by 
smoke from combusted tobacco products.”23 The prevailing reason 
behind this rationale is that, unlike traditional cigarettes, e-cigarette 
and vaporizer products are not operated through combustion, and 
thus these products do not release the numerous carcinogens that are 
present in traditional cigarettes.24 Furthermore, studies have also re-
vealed that the vapor released from e-cigarette usage does not pre-
sent the equivalent threats of second-hand smoke to bystanders as 
traditional cigarettes do.25 
Such studies have bolstered the credibility of various public 
health experts who advocate for a soft approach in regulating these 
 
Cigarettes in North America History, Use, and Implications for Smoking Cessa-
tion, 129 CIRCULATION 1945, 1946 (2014). 
 21 See Goldman, supra note 11. 
 22 Stacy Simon, Report: What’s Known About the Harms and Benefits of E-
Cigarettes, AM. CANCER SOC’Y (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.cancer.org/latest-
news/report-whats-known-about-the-harms-and-benefits-of-e-cigarettes.html. 
 23 Deeming Rule, supra note 16, at 28981. 
 24 See Julia Belluz, 4 Big Takeaways from the Most Comprehensive Report 
on E-Cigarettes Yet, VOX (Jan. 23, 2018, 2:18 PM), https://www.vox.com/sci-
ence-and-health/2018/1/23/16923070/nas-report-e-cigarettes-health-risks. 
(“There is conclusive evidence . . . that completely substituting e-cigarettes for 
combustible tobacco cigarettes reduces users’ exposure to numerous toxicants and 
carcinogens present in combustible tobacco cigarettes.”). 
 25 See Ashley Turner, Juul-sponsored Study Shows Secondhand Vaping 
Emissions Are Much Less Toxic Than Cigarette Smoke, CNBC (June 14, 2019, 
10:06 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/13/juul-study-shows-secondhand-
vaping-emissions-are-less-toxic-than-cigarette-smoke.html; Regulatory Obsta-
cles to Harm Reduction, supra note 16, at 725–26. 
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alternative tobacco products.26 Advocates of a soft regulatory ap-
proach seek to minimize the extent to which e-cigarette regulation 
may impede the ability of traditional cigarette smokers to use e-cig-
arettes as a means of aiding them in their efforts to quit smoking 
combustible cigarettes.27 This is because research surrounding these 
products indicates the potential for significant public health benefits 
for cigarette smokers who transition to e-cigarettes instead.28 In a 
May 2014 study, researchers conducted interviews with “nearly 
6000 smokers trying to quit on their own and found that about one 
in five using e-cigarettes had stopped smoking at the time of the sur-
vey, while only half that number—about one in 10—had been able 
to stop using conventional nicotine patches and gum.”29 Thus, sup-
porters contend that overly strict regulation of e-cigarettes may pre-
vent individuals from utilizing a less harmful means of nicotine con-
sumption.30 
By contrast, advocates for strict regulatory frameworks contend 
that the scientific uncertainty surrounding the potential long-term 
health effects of e-cigarette and vaping products may render these 
devices to be dangerous.31 Moreover, many fear that e-cigarette 
marketing may prompt smokers to engage in the dual use of both e-
cigarettes and traditional cigarettes rather than having the intended 
effect of assisting individuals to quit tobacco and nicotine 
 
 26 See, e.g., ST. GEORGE’S UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, E-Cigarettes Research 
Shows Clear Benefits of Switching from Tobacco, MED. PRESS (Oct. 10, 2018), 
https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-10-e-cigarettes-benefits-tobacco.html; see 
also Adler et al., supra note 15, at 339 n.153 (citing ROYAL COLLEGE OF 
PHYSICIANS. NICOTINE WITHOUT SMOKED: TOBACCO HARM REDUCTION (2016) 
(encouraging consumption of e-cigarettes in order to curb smoking). 
 27 See Goldman, supra note, 11. 
 28 See, e.g., ST. GEORGE’S UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, supra note 26; Adler et 
al., supra note 15, at 339. 
 29 Goldman, supra note 11. 
 30 See id.; Sabrina Tavernise, F.D.A. Imposes Rules for E-Cigarettes in a 
Landmark Move, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2016), https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/05/06/science/fda-rules-electronic-cigarettes.html?smid=pl-
share. 
 31 See SHAPIRO & ANEJA, supra note 15, at P7, P40; Mitchell Zeller et al., 
The Strategic Dialogue on Tobacco Harm Reduction: A Vision and Blueprint for 
Action in the US, 18 TOB CONTROL 324, 325–26, 331 (2009). 
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altogether.32 Furthermore, many public officials express serious 
concerns regarding e-cigarette marketing serving as a catalyst for 
increased youth nicotine addictions, as e-cigarette usage amongst 
our nation’s youth has significantly increased.33 In fact, Health and 
Human Services Secretary, Alex Azar, has noted that “[t]he United 
States has never seen an epidemic of substance use arise as quickly 
as our current epidemic of youth use of e-cigarettes.”34 In November 
2019, a report conducted by the Journal of the American Medical 
Association revealed “that more than 1 in 4 high school students 
(more than 5 million teens nationwide) now use flavored e-ciga-
rettes monthly, a significant increase from last year . . . .”35 This as-
tronomical figure is even more concerning when coupled with the 
opinions of medical professionals such as Dr. Tom Frieden of the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (the “CDC”), who be-
lieves that increased use of e-cigarette products by the nation’s 
youth will likely lead them to become addicted to traditional ciga-
rettes as well.36 As a result, public officials have been met with sig-
nificant pressure to take measures to reduce youth exposure to e-
cigarettes.37 
While e-cigarettes and vaporizer products remained largely un-
regulated for many years following their introduction into the U.S. 
 
 32 See Janine K. Cataldo et. al, E-Cigarette Marketing and Older Smokers: 
Road to Renormalization, AM. J. HEALTH BEHAV. 361, 369 (2015), 
https://www.bhthechange.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Handout5-E-Ciga-
rettes-and-Older-Adults.pdf. (“[E]-cigarette advertising promotes dual use and 
may contribute to the renormalization of smoking.”); Regulatory Obstacles to 
Harm Reduction, supra note 16, at 752 (citing David B. Abrams, Promise and 
Peril of E-Cigarettes: Can Disruptive Technology Make Cigarettes Obsolete?, 
311 JAMA 135 (2014)). 
 33 See Matt Richtel, Use of E-Cigarettes by Young People Is Major Concern, 
Surgeon General Declares, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/12/08/health/ecigarettes-united-states.html. 
 34 See Dan Vergano, Trump Just Announced a Nationwide Ban of All Vape 
Flavors Except Tobacco and Menthol, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan 2, 2020, 5:17 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/danvergano/trump-juul-flavor-ban. 
 35 Id. 
 36 See Karen Kaplan, CDC Director Explains What He Hates About Elec-
tronic Cigarettes, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.latimes.com/sci-
ence/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-why-tom-frieden-hates-electronic-cigarettes-cdc-
20140429-story.html. 
 37 See Vergano, supra note 34. 
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marketplace,38 health studies highlighting the potentially dangerous 
effects of these devices provided the federal government with sig-
nificant motivation to more closely examine the need for a stricter 
regulatory approach in the interest of protecting public health.39 In a 
2009 study conducted by the FDA, researchers discovered “detect-
able levels of toxic cancer-causing chemicals, including an ingredi-
ent used in antifreeze, in two leading brands of e-cigarettes and 18 
various cartridges.”40 Additionally, a 2014 study revealed that “aer-
osol from e-cigarettes with a higher voltage level contains more for-
maldehyde, another carcinogen with the potential to cause cancer.”41 
Moreover, in 2016, researchers determined that “people who use[] 
e-cigarettes [are] 30 percent more likely to . . . develop[] a chronic 
lung disease, including asthma, bronchitis and emphysema, than 
nonusers.”42 Most recently, in 2019, the American Journal of Pre-
ventive Medicine assessed the impact of e-cigarettes on the human 
respiratory system and concluded that “people who use only e-ciga-
rettes increase their risk of developing lung disease by about 30% 
compared with nonusers.”43 Despite these medical findings, how-
ever, strict regulatory measures for ENDS products remained 
 
 38 See Goldman, supra note 11. 
 39 See FDA Warns of Health Risks Posed by E-Cigarettes, FDA (July 2009), 
https://www.casaa.org/wp-content/uploads/FDA-Press-Release-2009.pdf; 
Greenberg, supra note 11, at 784. 
 40 Dieter Holger, 7 Reasons E-Cigarettes Are Bad, INQUISITR (Aug. 30, 
2015), https://www.inquisitr.com/2378144/7-reasons-e-cigarettes-are-bad/; Are 
Electronic Cigarettes Safe?, PIEDMONT HEALTHCARE, https://www.pied-
mont.org/living-better/are-electronic-cigarettes-safe. 
 41 Mary Brophy Marcus, E-Cigarette Flavorings Linked With Lung Disease, 
CBS NEWS (Dec. 8, 2015, 5:21 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/e-cigarette-
flavorings-linked-with-lung-disease/; Greenberg, supra note 11, at 784 (quoting 
E-Cigarettes and Lung Health, AM. LUNG ASS’N, http://eee.lung.org./stop-smok-
ing/smoking/smoking-facts/e-cigarettes-and-lung-health.html 
[https://perma.cc/VR3S-ZUNV].). 
 42 Erika Edwards, E-Cigarettes Linked to Lung Problems, First Long-term 
Study on Vaping Finds, NBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2019, 6:36 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/vaping/e-cigarettes-linked-lung-problems-
first-long-term-study-vaping-n1101641. 
 43 Kathleen Raven, Teen Vaping Linked to More Health Risks, YALE MED. 
(Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.yalemedicine.org/stories/teen-vaping/ (citing 
Dharma N. Bhatta & Stanton A. Glantz, Association of E-Cigarette Use with Res-
piratory Disease Among Adults: A Longitudinal Analysis, 58 AM. J. 
PREVENTATIVE MED. 182, 182–90 (2019)). 
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largely unenforced by the federal government until a nationwide 
“outbreak” of severe lung injuries took the public by storm.44 
II. THE FALL: RECENT OUTBREAKS 
The sale of e-cigarettes and vaporizers in the United States mar-
ket has steadily increased for nearly a decade.45 Widely publicized 
reports of serious vaping-related illnesses beginning in 2019, how-
ever, set the stage for what some public health officials consider to 
be our most recent “public health crisis.”46 The highly-publicized 
outbreaks of vaping-linked lung illnesses were first brought to the 
nation’s attention by the Illinois and Wisconsin state health depart-
ments in April 2019.47 Those departments tracked 53 patients, 
mostly young adult males, who were hospitalized after having re-
ported serious “coughing, chest pain or shortness of breath.”48 Since 
April 2019, there have been over 2,000 cases of vaping-linked ill-
nesses arising in every state in the nation.49 Of those 2,000 + cases, 
the CDC has confirmed at least 57 deaths in 27 states.50 Further, 
many victims who were fortunate to have escaped death “have 
ended up with acute respiratory distress syndrome, a life-threatening 
condition in which fluid builds up in the lungs and prevents [] oxy-
gen . . . from circulating in the bloodstream.”51 While these myste-
rious vaping-linked illnesses perplexed medical officials for months, 
 
 44 Matthew Sprankle & Audrey Davis, Up in Smoke: The Countdown on Vape 
Enforcement Discretion Begins, EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN: HEALTH L. ADVISOR 
BLOG (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.healthlawadvisor.com/2019/08/13/up-in-
smoke-the-countdown-on-vape-enforcement-discretion-begins/; see Vergano, su-
pra note 34. 
 45 See Knowles & Sun, supra note 6. 
 46 Is a Vaping-Linked Lung Illness a Public Health Crisis? That Depends On 
Who You Ask, PBS NEWS HOUR (Oct. 8, 2019, 2:54 PM), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/is-a-vaping-linked-lung-illness-a-public-
health-crisis-that-depends-on-who-you-ask; Outbreak of Lung Injury Associated 
with the Use of E-Cigarette, or Vaping, Products, CDC (Feb. 25, 2020, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-cigarettes/severe-lung-dis-
ease.html. 
 47 See Knowles & Sun, supra note 6. 
 48 See id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
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on November 8, 2019, “CDC officials announced a ‘breakthrough’ 
discovery” in their efforts to identify the precise cause of this newly 
identified lung disease formally named EVALI (the acronym stands 
for e-cigarette or vaping product use-associated lung injury).52 
The CDC stated that vitamin E acetate, a chemical commonly 
found in some THC products, appeared to be the likely culprit caus-
ing the recent EVALI outbreaks.53 That said, CDC officials noted 
that their discoveries were “inconclusive,” stating that “more than 
one chemical could be contributing” to the vaping-linked illnesses.54 
Although inconclusive, data collected by the CDC surrounding 
EVALI outbreaks shows a strong correlation between the presence 
of vitamin E acetate in the bodies of victims and the inhalation of 
vaporized THC products.55 In fact, the CDC announced that “nearly 
83 percent of 1,184 patients for whom relevant data is available re-
ported using THC-containing products, [the psychoactive compo-
nent of marijuana], in the three months before [developing] their 
symptoms.”56 That said, 13% of victims reported to have only vaped 
nicotine-containing products.57 Of that 13%, however, doctors have 
noted that some of the patients who stated that they had only vaped 
nicotine products tested positive for THC in their urine.58 Given this 
inconsistency, some doctors believe that patients are unwilling to 
admit having used marijuana, likely because the substance is illegal 
under federal law.59 Thus, with no conclusively identified singular 
cause of EVALI, the CDC has continued to actively compel those at 
higher risk, including young adults, to refrain from using all e-ciga-
rette and vaping-related products.60 Moreover, in the interest of 
 
 52 Id.; Raven, supra note 43; E-Cigarette or Vaping Product Use-Associated 
Lung Injury (EVALI), YALE MED, https://www.yalemedicine.org/condi-
tions/evali. 
 53 Raven, supra note 43. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See Knowles & Sun, supra note 6. 
 56 Id.; see Marijuana Research Report: How does marijuana produce its ef-
fects?, NAT’L INST. DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/re-
search-reports/marijuana/how-does-marijuana-produce-its-effects. 
 57 Knowles & Sun, supra note 6. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See id. 
 60 Outbreak of Lung Injury Associated with the Use of E-Cigarette, or Vap-
ing, Products, supra note 46. 
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protecting the public health of their citizens, various state and local 
officials have taken regulatory matters into their own hands.61 
On September 24, 2019, in response to the suspected link be-
tween the use of e-cigarette and vaping products and EVALI, “Mas-
sachusetts Governor Charlie Baker declared a public health emer-
gency . . . call[ing] for a ban on the sale of all flavored and non-fla-
vored vaping products and devices, including tobacco and mariju-
ana.”62 This public health emergency enforced a four-month ban on 
the sale of all vaping-related products both online and in retail 
stores.63 The decision to fully restrict the sale of these devices arose, 
in some part, because of “the absence of strong federal action by the 
FDA that is forcing states to have to make choices like this on how 
they are going to protect from e-cigarettes,” said Governor Baker.64 
That said, the seemingly abrupt and strict regulatory measures taken 
by Governor Baker were met with significant pushback from local 
retailers and consumers contending, among other things, that the 
governor’s decision would “push[] people into the illicit market—
precisely where the dangerous products are—[the decision] goes 
against every principle of public health and harm reduction.”65 Fur-
ther, in addition to opposition at the state level, the federal govern-
ment has also been faced with strong challenges regarding its current 
regulatory framework for e-cigarette and vaping products.66 
 
 61 See, e.g., Matt Stout, Baker Declares Public Health Emergency, Orders 4-




 62 States and Tribes Stepping in to Protect Communities from the Dangers of 
E-Cigarettes: Actions and Options (2020), PUB. HEALTH L. CTR. (Feb. 25, 2020), 
https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/resources/states-and-tribes-stepping-pro-
tect-communities-dangers-e-cigarettes-actions-and-options. 
 63 Mark Fortier et al., Sale of Vaping Products Temporarily Banned in Mas-
sachusetts as Gov. Baker Declares Public Health Emergency, NBC BOSTON 
(Sept. 25, 2019, 6:11 PM), https://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/gov-charlie-
baker-to-make-announcement-about-vaping-in-massachusetts/115821/. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See Stout, supra note 61. 
 66 See, e.g., Nicopure Labs, LLC v. FDA, 266 F. Supp. 3d. 360, 366 (D.D.C. 
2017). 
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III. FDA REGULATION: THE DEEMING RULE & PRE-MARKET 
APPROVAL 
The federal government has regulated the tobacco industry since 
1965 when Congress first passed the Cigarette Labeling and Adver-
tising Act (the “CLAA”).67 This legislation came on the heels of the 
1964 Surgeon General’s report, which first brought significant at-
tention to the serious health risks caused by smoking cigarettes.68 As 
a result, the passage of the 1965 CLAA imposed new rules requiring 
warning labels to be placed on all cigarette packages in order to in-
crease the public’s knowledge regarding the serious health risks as-
sociated with cigarettes.69 Since then, a myriad of tobacco control 
laws have been implemented at the federal level relating to youth 
access, labeling, and marketing.70 The inherent structure of tobacco 
regulation, however, remained largely unaltered until a series of lit-
igation arose in the 1990s, resulting in “the largest privately negoti-
ated transfer of wealth arising out of litigation in world history.”71 
During that decade, a compilation of states’ attorneys generals 
worked together to sue the largest tobacco companies in a tort lia-
bility suit, seeking compensation for health care costs incurred as a 
result of “treating sick and dying cigarette smokers.”72 By 1998, the 
four largest cigarette manufacturers entered into “The Master Set-
tlement Agreement” (the “MSA”) with forty-six states, which re-
quired, among other things, that the companies pay roughly $12.75 
 
 67 See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 
(1965); see also Matthew R. Herington, Tobacco Regulation in the United States: 
New Opportunities and Challenges, 23 HEALTH L. 13, 13–15 (2010). 
 68 CDC, History of the Surgeon General’s Reports on Smoking and Health, 
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/sgr/history/index.htm; Regulatory 
Obstacles to Harm Reduction: The Case of Smoking, supra note 16, at 715. 
 69 See Kelly A. Moore, Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 
1965, CENGAGE (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclo-
pedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/federal-cigarette-labeling-and-advertis-
ing-act-1965; Greenberg, supra note 11, at 780. 
 70 See Herington, supra note 67, at 13–15. 
 71 See Bruce Yandle et al., Bootleggers, Baptists & Televangelists: Regulat-
ing Tobacco by Litigation, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1225, 1227 (2008); Regulatory 
Obstacles to Harm Reduction, supra note 16, at 716; Greenberg, supra note 11, 
at 781. 
 72 Master Settlement Agreement: An Overview, PUB. HEALTH LAW CENTER, 
https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-fs-msa-
overview-2015.pdf; see Greenberg, supra note 11, at 781. 
1010 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:996 
 
billion annually to the states, agree to increased restrictions on their 
marketing and advertising practices in addition to an imposed tax 
that would increase the price of cigarettes.73 Although, before the 
MSA, lawsuits against tobacco manufacturers were primarily initi-
ated by private individuals seeking compensation for their injuries 
derived from cigarette usage.74 Much of this private litigation, how-
ever, proved to be unsuccessful as plaintiffs encountered challeng-
ing hurdles surrounding their claims of deceptive marketing prac-
tices because, by then, all cigarette packages had provided “govern-
ment-mandated warning[s].”75 As a result, this reinforced the large 
tobacco companies successful defenses in claiming that the plain-
tiffs had assumed the risk of using cigarettes.76 That being said, un-
like the private lawsuits, the lawsuits initiated by the states’ attor-
neys general were more powerful because the assumption of risk 
defense did not apply in the states’ suits.77 As one attorney general 
explained, “[t]his time, the industry cannot claim that a smoker 
knew full well what risks he took each time he lit up. The state of 
Mississippi never smoked a cigarette. Yet it has paid the medical 
expenses of thousands of indigent smokers who did.”78 As a result, 
the tobacco companies both recognized and appreciated the lurking 
threat of being faced with aggressive lawsuits by upwards of 50 
states, and thus they agreed to a revolutionary settlement deal with 
the states, paving the way for progressive tobacco regulation to 
come.79 
 
 73 Master Settlement Agreement: An Overview, supra note 72, at 2–3; see 
Greenberg, supra note 11, at 781; Yandle et al., supra note 71, at 1227. 
 74 See Adler et al., supra note 15, at 327 (citing Yandle et al., supra note 71, 
at 1259–63.). 
 75 See id. 
 76 See Stephen D. Sugarman, Mixed Results From Recent United States To-
bacco Litigation, 10 TORT REV. 1, 3 (2002); Lynn Mather, Theorizing about Trial 
Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and Tobacco Litigation, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 
897, 904 (1998). 
 77 See Adler et al., supra note 15, at 327; Michael DeBow, The State Tobacco 
Litigation and the Separation of Powers in State Governments. Repairing the 
Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 563, 571–72 (2001). 
 78 Mike Moore, The States Are Just Trying to Take Care of Sick Citizens and 
Protect Children, 83 A.B.A. J, 53, 53 (1997); see DeBow, supra note 77, at 572. 
 79 See Jess Alderman & Richard A. Daynard, Applying Lessons from Tobacco 
Litigation to Obesity Lawsuits, 30 AM. J. PREV. MED., 82, 83 (2006); Adler et al., 
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While the MSA laid the groundwork for cigarette regulatory 
measures, it did not possess “the force of federal law.”80 Years after 
the MSA, however, Congress passed the 2009 Family Smoking Pre-
vention and Tobacco Control Act (“The Tobacco Control Act” or 
“The Act”), which gave the FDA significant power to regulate to-
bacco products in various ways.81 Specifically, the Tobacco Control 
Act enabled the FDA to require cigarette manufacturers to disclose 
all of the “health information, including lists of ingredients by brand 
and sub-brand, descriptions of nicotine delivery [content], and doc-
umentation of the health effects of each product” they sold.82 Per-
haps most notably, the Act also imposed significant regulations on 
the marketing and advertising of modified risk products.83 Under the 
2009 legislation, a modified risk product constitutes “any tobacco 
product that is sold or distributed for use to reduce harm or the risk 
of tobacco-related disease associated with commercially marketed 
tobacco products.”84 Thus, if a cigarette manufacturer seeks to mar-
ket their product as being less harmful compared to other tobacco 
products, they are required “to support that claim with scientific ev-
idence” that “demonstrate[s] that the product will or is expected to 
benefit the health of the population as a whole,” before they can re-
ceive FDA approval.85 The Tobacco Control Act, however, when 
initially signed into law, did not extend its regulatory power over all 
types of tobacco-related products.86 
 
supra note 15, at 327–28; DeBow, supra note 77, at 567–68; Greenberg, supra 
note 11, at 781. 
 80 See Adler et al., supra note 15, at 330. 
 81 21 U.S.C. § 387a–1; see Greenberg, supra note 11, at 781; Adler et al., 
supra note 15, at 332. 
 82 A Deeming Regulation: What is Possible Under the Law, PUB. HEALTH L. 
CENTER https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-
fs-deeming-reg-what-is-possible-2014.pdf. 
 83 Id.; see Adler et al., supra note 15, at 332. 
 84 21 U.S.C. § 387k(b)(1). 
 85 See Modified Risk Tobacco Products, FDA (Sept. 17, 2020), 
https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/advertising-and-promotion/modified-
risk-tobacco-products; Greenberg, supra note 11, at 782. 
 86 See Goldman supra note 11; Greenberg, supra note 11, at 783. 
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A. Introducing: The Deeming Rule 
Non-tobacco nicotine delivery products such as vaporizers and 
e-cigarettes, remained unregulated by the Tobacco Control Act at 
the time of its passage.87 Thus, the “major gap in regulation”88 pre-
sented policymakers with difficult questions regarding how to fit 
these new electronic nicotine delivery systems into the previously 
existing tobacco regulatory regime.89 Because the Tobacco Control 
Act granted the FDA regulatory authority over “cigarettes, cigarette 
tobacco, roll-your-own tobacco, and smokeless tobacco and to any 
other tobacco products that the Secretary by regulation deems to be 
subject to this subchapter,” however, the agency was granted the 
legislative discretion to deem e-cigarettes and numerous other de-
vices as “tobacco products” subject to the Act.90 
Despite this broad grant of authority by Congress in 2009, the 
FDA refrained from taking any action to deem previously unregu-
lated tobacco products to be subject to the Tobacco Control Act until 
2016.91 In May of 2016, the FDA acted on its authority to impose a 
new rule that would deem e-cigarettes and other previously unregu-
lated tobacco products to be subject to all of the Tobacco Control 
Act’s requirements and to even further FDA product regulation.92 
The primary basis for the agency’s decision was to learn more about 
the potential for harm to public health.93 Not only did the Deeming 
Rule subject e-cigarettes and other vaporizer devices to new regula-
tions, the rule was also extended to include, among other things, 
 
 87 See Greenberg, supra note 11, at 783. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See Wendy E. Parmet, Paternalism, Self-Governance, and Public Health: 
The Case of E-Cigarettes, 70 U. MIA. L. REV. 879, 883 (2016). 
 90 See 21 U.S.C. § 387a(b) (emphasis added); Adler et al., supra note 15, at 
332–33. 
 91 See Deeming Rule, supra note 16, at 28974; Katelyn Newman, Vaping and 
E-Cigarettes: The New Public Health Problem, US NEWS (Sept. 30, 2019 at 9:00 
AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/healthiest-communities/articles/2019-09-
30/vaping-and-e-cigarettes-a-new-public-health-problem. 
 92 See Newman, supra note 91. 
 93 Deeming Rule, supra note 16, at 28983; see Regulatory Obstacles to Harm 
Reduction, supra note 16, at 733–34. 
2021] ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACKWARD 1013 
 
various components and parts of e-cigarettes and vaporizers such as 
their batteries, cartridges, e-liquids, and even device software.94 
Further, FDA enforcement of the Deeming Rule also required 
that e-cigarette and vaporizer manufacturers be subjected to a “man-
datory approval process that could hamstring all but the largest e-
cigarette producers.”95 Specifically, the Rule requires all “manufac-
turers of newly regulated tobacco products, that were not on the mar-
ket as of February 15, 2007, . . . to show that [their] products meet 
the applicable public health standard set by the law. And those man-
ufacturers will have to receive marketing authorization from the 
FDA.”96 In order to meet the applicable public health standards, 
manufacturers must submit an application to the FDA sufficiently 
demonstrating that its brand of e-cigarette is substantially equivalent 
to a product that was on the market in 2007.97 Given the recency of 
e-cigarette innovations, however, there were little to no commer-
cially marketed e-cigarettes as of February 15, 2007.98 Therefore, 
many industry leaders and even the FDA has acknowledged that 
nearly every e-cigarette company and product on the market will be 
unable to meet this required showing of substantial equivalence, 
and, as a result, companies will need to go through a procedure of 
premarket review prior to being permitted to lawfully sell their prod-
ucts in the U.S. marketplace.99 
B. Pre-market Tobacco Applications (“PMTAs”) 
Acquiring premarket approval, in most cases, poses significant 
challenges for the vast majority of e-cigarette and vaporizer 
 
 94 Deeming Rule supra note 16, at 28975; Greenberg, supra note 11, at 786–
87; see Adler, supra note 16, at 739. 
 95 Adler et al., supra note 15, at 314 (citing Tavernise, supra note 30.). 
 96 The Facts on the FDA’s New Tobacco Rule, FDA (Jun. 16, 2016), 
https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/facts-fdas-new-tobacco-rule; 
see Greenberg, supra note 11, at 787. 
 97 See 21 U.S.C. § 387j(a). 
 98 See Historical Timeline of Electronic Cigarettes, CASAA, 
http://www.casaa.org/historical-timeline-of-electronic-cigarettes/; Greenberg, su-
pra note 11, at 787; Parmet, supra note 89, at 941. 
 99 See Jacob Sullum,’Tobacco Products’ That Aren’t, REASON (May 5, 2014, 
8:30 AM), https://reason.com/2014/05/05/tobacco-products-that-arent/; Parmet, 
supra note 89, at 941 (citing The FDA & Deeming Regulations of E-Cigarettes, 
CASAA (Mar. 3, 2013), http://casaa.org/deeming_ regulations.html.). 
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manufacturers who seek to lawfully sell their products in the U.S. 
marketplace.100 In April of 2020, a U.S. District Court judge in Mar-
yland issued a revised order requiring that companies engaged in the 
sale of e-cigarette devices prior to the August 8, 2016, passage of 
the Deeming Rule submit applications for market approval by Sep-
tember 9, 2020, in order to continue selling their products.101 Com-
panies that did not have products on the market prior to the August 
8, 2016, passage of the Deeming Rule must submit a PMTA and 
receive FDA approval before being permitted to engage in the law-
ful sale of their products.102 Furthermore, the rule exempts tradi-
tional tobacco products from the PMTA requirements because 
nearly all traditional cigarettes were marketed prior to 2007, grand-
fathering those products in.103 Such a rule of construction provides 
a windfall to the big tobacco companies because if e-cigarette man-
ufacturers are forced out of business due to an inability to meet the 
financial burdens of the PMTA requirements, then the big tobacco 
companies would have less competition.104 
PMTAs require that manufacturers begin by providing samples 
of their products along with “descriptive information” about their 
product’s “formulation and design, the nicotine strength, [and] in-
structions for its use.”105 Further, manufacturers must also include 
“detailed scientific studies and analyses of research findings,”106 
 
 100 See Tavernise, supra note 30. 
 101 Azim Chowdhury & Eric Gotting, Maryland District Court Extends Pre-
market Application Submission Deadline to September 9, 2020 in Light of Coro-
navirus Outbreak; Appeal of the Merits Continues with the Fourth Circuit, 
CONTINUUM RISK (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.thecontinuumofrisk.com/
2020/04/maryland-district-court-extends-pmta-submission-deadline-to-septem-
ber-9-2020-in-light-of-coronavirus-outbreak-appeal-of-the-merits-continues-
with-the-fourth-circuit/; see American Academy of Pediatrics, et al. v. FDA, et 
al., No. 8:18-cv-00883, Docket No. 182 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2020) (modifying a 
remedy order). 
 102 See Sprankle & Davis, supra note 44. 
 103 See Sullum, supra note 99. 
 104 See Regulatory Obstacles to Harm Reduction, supra note 16, at 740–41 
(citing Tavernise, supra note 30); Sheila Kaplan, F.D.A. Delays Rules That Would 
Have Limited E-Cigarettes on Market, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/health/electronic-cigarette-tobacco-nico-
tine-fda.html. 
 105 Sprankle & Davis, supra note 44. 
 106 Id. 
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which “show the health risks of such tobacco product and whether 
such tobacco product presents less risk than other tobacco prod-
ucts.”107 Finally, each PMTA must also include “information on 
how to minimize the risks associated with ENDS batteries and to 
address the likelihood of use and misuse leading to overheating, fire, 
and explosion.”108 
Before a manufacturer submits their PMTA and receives FDA 
approval, the manufacturer is prohibited from making any commer-
cial statements that “explicitly or implicitly” state that a product 
“presents a lower risk of tobacco-related disease or is less harmful 
than one or more other commercially marketed tobacco prod-
ucts, . . . contains a reduced level of a substance or presents a re-
duced exposure to a substance, . . . or does not contain or is free of 
a substance.”109 Interestingly, manufacturers are even prohibited 
from repeating the FDA’s own statements regarding the health risks 
of e-cigarettes relative to traditional cigarettes.110 Thus, despite the 
fact that FDA has publicly stated that “the inhalation of nicotine 
(e.g., nicotine without the products of combustion) is of less risk to 
the user than the inhalation of nicotine delivered by smoke from 
combusted tobacco products,” manufacturers are prohibited from in-
cluding this statement in any form of product advertising without 
first having their PMTA approved by the FDA.111 Furthermore, 
prior to receiving the FDA’s blessing, “[a]n electronic cigarette 
company cannot even inform consumers that the[ir] product does 
not produce smoke.”112 
Acquiring PMTA approval poses significant challenges for 
manufacturers because of how expensive and time-consuming the 
process is.113 The FDA has estimated that the research costs associ-
ated with gathering the required data for a single product to be 
 
 107 Greenberg, supra note 11, at 788; see 21 U.S.C. § 387j(b)(1)(A). 
 108 Sprankle & Davis, supra note 44. 
 109 See Adler, supra note 9. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 See Sullum, supra note 99. 
 113 See Tavernise, supra note 30; Susan Adams, E-Cigarette Manufacturers 
Say New Regulations Will Devastate The Industry, FORBES (May 5, 2016, 3:01 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2016/05/05/e-cigarette-manu-
facturers-say-new-regulations-will-devastate-the-industry/#4a9ea62266d4. 
1016 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:996 
 
between $117,000 and $466,000.114 The magnitude of these costs is 
extreme given that manufacturers are required to submit a PMTA 
for each individual product, which includes each “differing flavor 
variant” and each level of “nicotine strength” offered.115 All altera-
tions in product design and packaging, are also treated as a different 
product.116 Thus, because most manufacturers of e-cigarettes and 
vaping products produce numerous different flavors and varying 
levels of nicotine content, the total cost of filing applications for all 
of a manufacturer’s products may cost millions of dollars.117 For ex-
ample, Apollo Electronic Cigarettes, one of the more popular man-
ufacturers in the vaping industry,118 produces over a dozen different 
flavors of vaping liquid, each of which are available in five varying 
levels of nicotine content.119 The company would be required to sub-
mit 60 individual PMTAs in order to keep producing and selling 
their flavor options after the May 2020 deadline,.120 Thus, Apollo 
Electronic Cigarettes’ total costs for filling applications for all of its 
products would run the company between roughly $7,000,000 and 
$28,000,000 with no guarantee that their product applications will 
even receive FDA approval.121 In addition to the costly prices, 
PMTAs are also significantly time-consuming as the FDA estimates 
that the process for filing a PMTA “will require 1,500 hours per 
 
 114 See FDA, Commonly Asked Questions: About the Center for Tobacco 
Products (Jun. 11, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/about-center-to-
bacco-products-ctp/commonly-asked-questions-about-center-tobacco-products. 
 115 Id.; see Kaleigh Rogers, Five Ways the FDA’s New Regulations Will 
Transform the Vaping Industry, VICE (May 5, 2016, 4:50 PM), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4xa3kq/five-ways-the-fdas-new-regulations-
with-transform-the-vaping-industry-e-cigarettes; Regulatory Hurdles to Harm 
Reduction, supra note 16, at 738; Greenberg, supra note 11, at 790. 
 116 See FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: DEMONSTRATING THE SUBSTANTIAL 
EQUIVALENCE OF A NEW TOBACCO PRODUCT: RESPONSES TO FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS (EDITION 3) 3 (2016), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Tobac-
coProducts/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/UCM436468.pdf; Reg-
ulatory Obstacles to Harm Reduction, supra note 16, at 738. 
 117 See Rogers, supra note 114. 
 118 See Apollo E-Cigarette and E-Liquids – Popular, Reliable, Affordable, 
BEST E-CIGARETTE GUIDE (Jan. 24, 2020), https://best-e-cigarette-guide.com/e-
cigarette-reviews/apollo-ecigarette-and-e-liquids-popular-reliable-affordable/. 
 119 Id.; see Greenberg, supra note 11, at 790 (analyzing impact on time-con-
sumption for Apollo e-cigarettes to submit 60 PMTAs). 
 120 Greenberg, supra note 11, at 790. 
 121 See id. at 789–90. 
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product.”122 As a result, Apollo Electronic Cigarettes would likely 
need to spend approximately 90,000 hours in order to obtain FDA 
approval for all the variations of their product.123 What this demon-
strates is that manufacturers could potentially spend thousands of 
hours and millions of dollars in preparation for PMTA filings with-
out the guarantee that their applications are even going to be ap-
proved. In fact, as of November 2019, the FDA had received 389 
PMTAs.124 Of those 389 applications, only one has been granted 
FDA approval for an e-cigarette product.125 The application was 
submitted by Philip Morris, one of the largest and most profitable 
cigarette manufacturers in the tobacco industry.126 Thus, in the eyes 
of the American Vaping Association, this regulatory procedure “is 
not regulation—it is prohibition.”127 
Given the infancy of the vaping industry, it is important to note 
that the majority of manufacturers are not entities such as Big 
Pharma or Big Tobacco, which have the resources to take on these 
extreme PMTA requirements.128 Instead, the burdensome PMTA re-
quirements threaten to eviscerate smaller businesses who simply do 
not have the financial resources to conduct sufficient research in or-
der to have their applications approved.129 Furthermore, assuming 
that a manufacturer does have the necessary resources to receive 
 
 122 Id. at 789–90 (citing Rogers, supra note 115). 
 123 Id. 
 124 Tara Lin Couch & Mark J. Vaders, FDA Holds Public Meeting on PMTAs 
for Deemed Products Meeting Summary, FOOD & DRUG L. INST. (Nov. 2019), 
https://www.fdli.org/2019/11/fda-holds-public-meeting-on-pmtas-for-deemed-
products-meeting-summary/. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id.; see The Facts about Philip Morris International: Company Is Cause 
of the Tobacco Problem, Not the Solution, TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, https://www.to-
baccofreekids.org/what-we-do/industry-watch/pmi-foundation/bad-acts (last vis-
ited May 15, 2021); Press Release, FDA, FDA permits sale of IQOS Tobacco 
Heating System Through Premarket Tobacco Product Application Pathway (Apr. 
30, 2019); Tomi Kilgore, Philip Morris’s Stock Gains After Profit, Revenue Beat 
Expectations (Oct. 20, 2020, 7:11 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
philip-morriss-stock-gains-after-profit-revenue-beat-expectations-2020-10-20. 
 127 Tavernise, supra note 30. 
 128 See Adams, supra note 113. 
 129 See id.; Shari Rudavsky, Indiana Vape Shop Owners Say New FDA Rule 
Will Crush Industry, INDY STAR (May 9, 2016), https://www.in-
dystar.com/story/news/2016/05/08/indiana-vape-shop-owners-say-new-fda-rule-
crush-industry/84036264/. 
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application approval, the increased costs that the company will ab-
sorb from PMTA requirements will inevitably drive up the purchase 
price of their products for the consumer. Due to the heightened costs 
of production, companies will be forced to increase the price of their 
products in order to maintain their revenue figures.130 As a result, 
this mark-up in price will likely have an adverse effect on consumers 
by compelling them to purchase deadly, traditional cigarettes as op-
posed to more expensive, but less harmful e-cigarettes.131 
Moreover, one of the most serious concerns arising from this 
regulatory framework is “stifling innovation.”132 As a result of the 
immense costs, time, and research requirements, which are beyond 
the reach of most manufacturers, companies will have significantly 
less incentive to invest in innovative technologies to develop new 
safer alternatives to traditional cigarettes.133 This serious disruption 
to the advancements of public health may very well reinvigorate a 
tobacco market dominated, once again, by traditional cigarettes sci-
entifically proven to cause death and serious disease.134 
Notwithstanding these legitimate concerns, the FDA has main-
tained its position that imposing the deeming regulations on e-ciga-
rette and vaping products will aid in protecting public health.135 The 
agency, however, failed to identify and quantify the specific health 
benefits that would result from such a broad extension of the Deem-
ing Rule. Indeed, the FDA has even conceded that the “direct bene-
fits of making each of the newly deemed tobacco products subject 
to the requirements of chapter IX of the [Food, Drug and Cosmetic] 
Act are difficult to quantify, and [the FDA] cannot predict the size 
 
 130 See Rudavsky, supra note 129. 
 131 See id.; Greenberg, supra note 11, at 798–99. 
 132 See Gregory Conley, Use Common Sense on E-Cigarettes, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (July 30, 2014), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/arti-
cles/2014/07/30/fda-should-not-classify-e-cigarettes-as-tobacco-products; 
Greenberg, supra note 11, at 798; Adler, supra note 16, at 752 (citing Abrams, 
supra note 32). 
 133 See Greenberg, supra note 11, at 799 (citing Michael Siegel, POV: New 
FDA Regulations on Vaping Products a Failure, BU TODAY (July 13, 2016), 
https://www.bu.edu/articles/2016/fda-vaping-regulations). 
 134 See Abrams, supra note 32, at 135; Regulatory Obstacles to Harm Reduc-
tion , supra note 16, at 752. 
 135 See Regulatory Obstacles to Harm Reduction, supra note 16, at 741 (citing 
The Facts on the FDA’s New Tobacco Rule, supra note 96). 
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of these benefits at this time.”136 Thus, although the FDA has pub-
licly affirmed their own findings regarding the lessened health risks 
of e-cigarettes relative to traditional cigarettes,137 the agency re-
mains committed to the proposition that the regulation of e-ciga-
rettes as traditional cigarettes is necessary to “benefit public health,” 
despite the fact that they are not certain as to how.138 
Under the current FDA regulatory framework, the decision to 
regulate e-cigarettes in an identical fashion to that of traditional to-
bacco cigarettes poses undeniable constraints on innovation and 
threatens to undo the substantial progress made to reduce cigarette-
related injuries.139 As stated in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 
Applying overly burdensome, expensive regulatory 
hurdles to e-cigarettes could stifle innovation and fa-
vor the market domination of tobacco companies, 
which potentially promote dual use of cigarettes and 
e-cigarettes to minimize losing market share for their 
primary cigarette products. Independent e-cigarette 
companies . . . are more likely to have the goal of 
eliminating combusted cigarettes.140 
While e-cigarettes are not free of all health risks, what is clear is that 
they have the potential to produce public health benefits by provid-
ing a less harmful alternative to a scientifically proven lethal prod-
uct.141 As such, this Note does not advocate for the proposition that 
e-cigarettes should go completely unregulated, but rather that soci-
ety would benefit from an elastic regulatory framework capable of 
building in adjustment as the facts change. The remaining question 
becomes what type of regulatory framework is flexible enough to 
 
 136 Deeming Rule, supra note 16, at 28981; see Regulatory Obstacles to Harm 
Reduction, supra note 16, at 741; Greenberg, supra note 11, at 797. 
 137 Deeming Rule, supra note 16, at 28984; see Adler, supra note 9. 
 138 Deeming Rule, supra note 16, at 28984; Regulatory Obstacles to Harm 
Reduction, supra note 16, at 741. 
 139 See Regulatory Obstacles to Harm Reduction, supra note 16, at 752. 
 140 Id. (citing Abrams, supra note 32, at 135); Abrams, supra note 32, at 135 
(citing Riccardo Polosa & Pasquale Caponnetto, Time for Evidence-based E-Cig-
arette Regulation, 14 LANCET 582, 582–83 (2013). 
 141 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 22; Smoking and Tobacco Use: Fast Facts, 
supra note 1. 
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minimize the risks of products that are not yet fully understood with-
out hindering the development and industry growth of products with 
potentially large public health value. The answer may be found 
through the use of state tort law as “civil courts provide an alterna-
tive governmental arena for implementing and sometimes develop-
ing public polic[y] . . . .”142 
IV. PRODUCTS LIABILITY: BALANCING DETERRENCE AND 
INCENTIVIZATION 
Products liability theory serves to benefit both individual victims 
and society as a whole.143 In general, tort law and products liability 
suits have three main goals.144 The first goal, on the individual level, 
is to serve as a vehicle for injured victims to receive compensation 
for their product-related injuries.145 This compensation may “in-
clude economic losses such as medical expenses or lost wages, and 
noneconomic losses such as pain and suffering.”146 Second, prod-
ucts liability suits serve a social function of deterring manufacturers 
from producing unsafe products.147 This deterrence function occurs 
mainly by punishing product manufacturers “through [the] assess-
ment of punitive damages.”148 Third, there are economic goals of 
products liability theory that also seek to provide a benefit to society. 
In general, tort law seeks to allocate resources efficiently “by attrib-
uting the social costs of accidents to those who cause them—for ex-
ample, irresponsible corporations.”149 Thus, while products liability 
suits and federal regulation both serve to benefit the public health 
by preventing “the production [and] use of unsafe products,” 
 
 142 Mather, supra note 76, at 933 (citing Jacob Herbert, Courts and Politics in 
the United States in COURTS LAW AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
64 (1996)). 
 143 See Susan Bartlett Foote, Product Liability and Medical Device Regula-
tion: Proposal for Reform in NEW MEDICAL DEVICES: INVENTION, 
DEVELOPMENT, AND USE 73 (Karen B. Ekelman ed., 1988). 
 144 Id. at 75. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 73–74. 
 148 Id. at 75; see Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a 
Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L. J., 639, 641 (1980). 
 149 Foote, supra note 143, at 75. 
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products liability suits provide the added functions of victim com-
pensation and social punishment.150 Social deterrence and the threat 
of punishment through punitive damages can be strong motivating 
factors by which products are forced to be made safer.151 In fact, in 
the case of Big Tobacco, R.J. Reynolds began engaging in measures 
to develop a safer traditional cigarette and desired to inform con-
sumers about these plans.152 Before the company could spread the 
news, however, their attorney swiftly warned Reynolds to refrain 
from taking such action “because of two words: product liability.”153 
In November 2019, Apple made the decision to remove “181 
vaping apps from its online store.”154 Many of those now prohibited 
apps contain software that allows the user to configure various set-
tings on their vape devices including the temperature at which vape 
fluids are vaporized.155 Thus, following the lead of recent state and 
federal regulations, Apple has taken steps to “distance itself” from 
various manufacturing companies in the vaping industry.156 This 
raises interesting questions as to whether intermediaries such as Ap-
ple are exposed to liability when they provide a marketplace for 
products that may or may not be dangerous. The answer to this ques-
tion is likely no given that generally, under United States law, inter-
mediaries that provide an online marketplace for mobile applica-
tions are protected against liability for the conduct of independent 
third-party app developers in a similar way to how online market-
place providers like Amazon are generally not liable for product de-
fects arising in products manufactured by third-parties and sold 
 
 150 Id. at 79. 
 151 See Alderman & Daynard, supra note 79, at 86 (citing Daniel Givelber, 
Pure Smoke: Product Liability, Innovation, and the Search for the Safe Cigarette, 
7 TULANE J. TECH. INTELL. PROP. 1–49 (2005)). 
 152 Id. 
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 154 Jack Nicas & Amie Tsang, Apple to Ban Vaping Apps From Its Store, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/business/apple-
vaping-apps.html. 
 155 See id. 
 156 See id. 
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through Amazon’s platform.157 This remains true “even if the [inter-
mediaries] take an active role in selecting the apps.”158 
Despite this legal protection for intermediaries like Apple, what 
seems implicit in the background is the notion that if and when dan-
gerous products result in consumer injuries, companies fear threats 
of liability.159 Thus, what seems relatively apparent is that federal 
regulation is not the only concern for e-cigarette and vaporizer man-
ufactures who wish to profit from the sale of their products. Without 
access to large online marketplaces such as Apple and other equiv-
alent business entities, various e-cigarette and vaporizer manufac-
turers face the danger of significant product marginalization.160 
Thus, Apple may have the leverage to presumably impose signifi-
cant regulatory responses on e-cigarette and vaporizer manufactur-
ers who wish to sell their products in online marketplaces even be-
fore the courts get involved. In an effort to carefully avoid liability, 
Apple may, however, risk being careless in looking closely at the 
governing bodies of law when determining if they truly could face 
exposure to liability for marketing these applications. 
That being said, if Apple decides to preclude marketplace entry 
to a substantial portion of the vaping industry, it could potentially 
face impending lawsuits by the manufacturers. In the event that Ap-
ple proceeds with this course of action, small businesses are going 
to be denied access to a large online marketplace, which may cause 
some of the businesses to fail and could inevitably lead those 
 
 157 CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY: PROTECTING 
INTERNET PLATFORMS FOR EXPRESSION AND INNOVATION 6–7 (2010), 
https://www.cdt.org/paper/intermediary-liability-protecting-internet-platforms-
expressionand-innovation (citing 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1)); see John Severance, 
Judge: Couple Can’t Sue Amazon for Fire Caused by Hoverboard Purchased 
From Chinese Seller, COOK CNTY. REC. (Apr. 2, 2019), 
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zon-for-fire-caused-by-hoverboard-purchased-from-chinese-seller. 
 158 CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., MOBILE PLATFORMS AS 
INTERMEDIARIES: LIABILITY PROTECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, AND CANADA 2–3 (2012), https://cdt.org/wp-content/up-
loads/pdfs/Mobile-Platforms-As-Intermediaries.pdf. 
 159 See Thomas C. Galligan, Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Pub-
lic Tort, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019, 1031–32 (2001), https://scholar-
lycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol58/iss3/6. 
 160 See Apple Bans Major Vaporizers, TVAPE REV. BLOG, https://toron-
tovaporizer.ca/blog/apple-bans-major-vaporizers/ (Sept. 29, 2020). 
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businesses to bring lawsuits against Apple claiming tortious inter-
ference.161 This begs the question of whether those businesses would 
have a viable claim for tortious interference if Apple precludes them 
from a large online marketplace while lacking sufficient knowledge 
regarding whether e-cigarette and vaporizers actually pose a signif-
icant public health risk. Although not a topic for this Note, there 
seems to be a potential for valid claims of tortious interference with 
contractual relations under these circumstances.162 
What this example demonstrates is that corporations have a sig-
nificant interest in taking measures to avoid exposure to tort liability 
claims.163 Thus, if there is truth to the notion that the threat of tort 
liability is capable of imposing self-regulation on the e-cigarette and 
vaping industries, it begs the question of what added benefit strict 
federal regulation provides in managing the potential uncertainties 
associated with these products. The Master Settlement Agreement, 
which was struck between the States and the largest cigarette man-
ufacturers, is a prime example of how the threat of tort liability has 
the power to force regulatory measures upon large corporations.164 
Furthermore, even if FDA requirements are fulfilled, in most cases, 
“compliance with federal . . . regulations does not preclude a jury 
from concluding that the product is unsafe, either because the design 
is defective or the warnings inadequate.”165 Thus, courts may find 
that a product has a defective design or an inadequate warning even 
if the product contains the FDA mandated language in its warning 
labels and the agency has approved the product as being safe.166 This 
is not an unusual occurrence as “one trial lawyer [has] asserted that 
 
 161 See Andrew Medal, Assessing the Effects of Apple’s Ban on Vaping Apps, 
ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/342899; 
see also Jamie Maggard et al., What Constitutes “Wrongful Conduct” in Interfer-
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 163 See, e.g., DeBow, supra note 77, at 580. 
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‘an effective presentation can be made in court that the FDA’s stand-
ards . . . do not preclude recovery since they are so ineffectual as to 
be virtually meaningless.’”167 Therefore, perhaps the most flexible 
and efficient way of regulating innovative modified risk tobacco 
products can be achieved through product liability claims based on 
state tort law with some federal regulatory measures enforced. This 
contention finds its support by analyzing the historical reformation 
of the Big Tobacco industry, which demonstrates that while govern-
mental legislation can, at times, lend itself to constructive regula-
tion, “litigation is often necessary to affect industry practices at the 
national level.”168 
State tort law causes of action have historically provided con-
sumers of tobacco-related products with remedies for injuries in-
curred as a result of deceptive or misleading product warnings.169 
Further, Congress has acknowledged that private litigation has 
played an essential role in exposing tobacco industry practices in 
addition to effective regulatory measures necessary to combat those 
practices.170 It is the adversarial nature of litigation that is capable 
and arguably most effective for exposing both the dangers of spe-
cific products in addition to any deceptive or misleading claims, 
warnings, or product labeling.171 Tort law liability suits do, how-
ever, have drawbacks as they may not always serve as an effective 
means by which to achieve information gathering regarding poten-
tially dangerous products due to the fact that “over 90 percent of 
[tort law] suits are settled out of court.”172 There is an undeniable 
threat to information gathering in the products liability arena given 
the “pressure from individuals and their lawyers [to receive] com-
pensation.”173 The desire for individuals to receive compensation 
may lead to most cases being settled, which can impede information 
 
 167 Id. (quoting Raney, M. B. 1986. Medical-device Defects. Trial (May): 39–
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 168 Alderman & Daynard, supra note 79, at 82. 
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gathering processes necessary to improve product safety.174 Such a 
threat, however, may be neutralized by having states bring lawsuits 
on behalf of victims.175 
State-initiated litigation occurred in the context of traditional 
cigarettes in which numerous states’ attorneys general initiated law-
suits against some of the largest cigarette manufacturers in the in-
dustry.176 This series of litigation revealed significant information 
about the tobacco industry by focusing “media and public attention 
on the plaintiffs’ cigarette-induced suffering, as well as exciting 
widespread discussion and debate on the larger issues of personal 
and corporate responsibility.”177 Furthermore, the litigation also re-
vealed substantial information through compelled disclosures, in-
cluding “evidence of nicotine research within the industry,” which 
assisted attorneys in developing legal arguments that the tobacco 
companies conspired to “hide scientific evidence about the [known] 
dangers of smoking . . . .”178 In sum, tobacco litigation proved to be 
a significant instrument for advancing public health as it exposed 
damaging information about the tobacco industry and laid the foun-
dation for subsequent governmental regulations.179 
When trial court activities are covered by the media, as was the 
case with traditional cigarettes, this “may have similar effects to Su-
preme Court actions in increasing public awareness and legitimacy 
of [the] issues before them.”180 Therefore, if we believe that tort lit-
igation is a capable vehicle for both generating and integrating ex-
pert knowledge in order to expose dangerous products without FDA 
intervention, then there seems to be no justifiable reason for the fed-
eral government to try and force-fit e-cigarette and vaporizer prod-
ucts into FDA regulatory processes like the Deeming Rule, which 
was not designed for them. This contention is further supported by 
 
 174 See id. at 76. 
 175 See Mather, supra note 76, at 931. 
 176 See DeBow, supra note 77, at 566–70 (explaining the history of state-ini-
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the FDA’s own statements noted above, in which the agency has 
unambiguously conceded that it is not exactly sure how to quantify 
the direct benefits of imposing the Deeming Rule on e-cigarettes and 
vaporizer products.181 
At present, current FDA regulatory measures are ineffectively 
utilized. As discussed, the requirements for PMTA approval impose 
significant costs on many industry manufacturers who simply do not 
have the resources to meet those requirements.182 As a result, such 
high costs will likely force many, especially smaller companies, out 
of the industry.183 Further, for the select minority of companies that 
can meet the PMTA burdens, the imposition of these newly imposed 
costs will likely result in increased product pricing to fall on the 
shoulders of consumers, and thus potentially disincentivize them 
from purchasing a less dangerous, but more expensive tobacco al-
ternative.184 Lastly, the excessive requirements to receive PMTA ap-
proval also pose a serious threat to the “stifling [of] innovation” by 
disincentivizing investment in new technologies.185 As such, there 
is a pressing need for a regulatory regime that strikes an appropriate 
middle ground between protecting the public health interest without 
imposing significant constraints on industry growth, product inno-
vation, and consumer access to alternative harm reducing e-cigarette 
devices. 
In order to accomplish this goal, e-cigarettes and vaporizers 
must not be subject to regulation in the same fashion as traditional 
cigarettes. There are two compelling reasons for this. First, tradi-
tional cigarettes are scientifically proven to be lethal killers whereas 
the harmful effects of e-cigarette and vaporizers remain largely in-
conclusive.186 What is conclusive, however, is that e-cigarettes and 
vaporizers possess potential promise as a healthier alternative to 
 
 181 Deeming Rule, supra note 16, at 28981. 
 182 See Adams, supra note 113. 
 183 See id. 
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traditional cigarettes.187 Thus, until there is conclusive science indi-
cating that e-cigarettes and vaporizer products cause a substantial 
threat to public health, the current FDA regulatory framework lacks 
a rational basis and may, in the final analysis, “do more harm than 
good” in regards to protecting public health.188 To be clear, this Note 
does not argue that the federal government should refrain from im-
posing any regulatory measures; rather, there needs to be an appro-
priate balance between state and federal regulatory means because 
solely utilizing rigid federal regulatory measures does not allow for 
adjustment to be built in as the facts change. That said, under tort 
law, adjustment can happen automatically as the facts change and 
suddenly the litigation looks different. As such, tort law may provide 
a flexible framework for regulation that can be utilized in conjunc-
tion with specific federal regulatory requirements. 
One middle-ground position for a regulatory regime that incor-
porates both state tort law and federal regulatory measures may be 
that the federal government first imposes serious restrictions on 
marketing tactics aimed at the youth by, among other things, ban-
ning the sale of flavored e-cigarettes as President Donald Trump and 
other officials have sought to do.189 The available data clearly re-
flects a heightened correlation between commercial sales of flavored 
e-cigarettes and increased use by minors as recent studies indicate 
that “[y]outh e-cigarette users cite flavors as a top reason they began 
using e-cigarettes.”190 Second, in light of the recent outbreaks of 
EVALI,191 which have revealed the THC thickening agent, vitamin 
E acetate, to likely be the primary culprit attributable to the myste-
rious vape-related lung diseases, the federal government should also 
impose a complete ban on the use of this thickening agent in all va-
porizer products.192 Third, the FDA should implement restrictions 
on the voltage or temperature settings at which e-cigarette and va-
porizer devices can heat their liquids, given evidence indicating that 
 
 187 See Michael Joseph Blaha, 5 Vaping Facts You Need to Know, JOHNS 
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sufficiently high temperatures may cause users to be exposed to in-
creased levels of formaldehyde, but lower temperatures and voltages 
produce no exposure.193 By restricting the sale of flavored e-ciga-
rettes, prohibiting the use of vitamin e-acetate, and restricting device 
voltages, the FDA will retain its regulatory measures designed to 
protect the public health while eliminating most unintended adverse 
impacts of the current regulatory scheme. These FDA regulatory 
measures are appropriate because they address concrete and cur-
rently identifiable threats to public health. 
Furthermore, to promote effective information gathering pro-
cesses, the FDA should also implement an incentive system for 
manufacturers in order to increase the volume and quality of infor-
mation provided to the agency.194 Such an incentive system can be 
utilized to address the current burdens of the PMTA approval pro-
cess. Instead of requiring that all e-cigarette and vaporizer manufac-
turers be subjected to the financial burdens of the PMTA approval 
process, the FDA should consider making PMTA requirements op-
tional, but provide meaningful incentives for companies that do ful-
fill the PMTA requirements. In order to properly incentivize those 
companies that meet the PMTA requirements, the FDA could de-
velop a rule of construction that would impose a defense or bar 
against products liability suits brought against those companies.195 
Thus, if a company’s PMTA receives FDA approval, then the com-
pany would be insulated from tort liability.196 If a company, how-
ever, decides not to apply for or does not receive PMTA approval 
for their product, then that company would not be provided insula-
tion from tort liability suits based on defective design or inadequate 
warnings or labels.197 Under this regulatory scheme, there will likely 
be consolidation of the industry given that there will inevitably be 
manufacturers that decide not to take advantage of the FDA incen-
tives given a lack of resources, time, or otherwise, and thus will be-
come exposed to lawsuits. That said, companies will have a strong 
incentive to comply with the PMTA requirements given that 
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damages incurred as a result of product liability suits have histori-
cally forced manufacturers into bankruptcy.198 Aside from these reg-
ulatory measures, however, the federal government should permit 
state tort law to manage the remaining though uncertain risks asso-
ciated with e-cigarette and vaporizer products. 
To effectuate the functions of social deterrence and punishment, 
product liability suits involving e-cigarette and vaporizer products 
should be brought by the states themselves on behalf of victims in-
stead of by private individuals.199 This type of public law regime 
would presumably decrease the number of cases that settle out of 
court, and thus increase the effectiveness of information gathering 
through litigation, which integrates the use of expert knowledge. 
Furthermore, such a regime may also protect private individuals 
against a “scorched earth” litigation strategy, whereby large compa-
nies utilize their immense resources to delay litigation proceedings 
and refuse to engage in settlement negotiations in an effort to 
“wear[] down plaintiffs financially and emotionally.”200 Such a pub-
lic law regime, however, could raise the issue of whether states can 
be fully entrusted with the responsibility of initiating lawsuits 
against industries when such action is appropriate.201 One mitigating 
factor on this issue may be that providing states with this right of 
action would allow for an entity to exercise a middle position judg-
ment because while the states may have some political accountabil-
ity, they also have real interests in money in addition to the benefi-
ciaries who will vote for them.202 That said, such a regime may also 
delay the time in which victims eventually receive compensation be-
cause the cases may not settle quickly, if at all. Nevertheless, the 
increase in information gathering through state-initiated litigation 
may outweigh this concern.203  
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CONCLUSION 
Products such as e-cigarette and vaporizers present uncertain 
health risks yet to be fully understood.204 At the same time, these 
products also possess potentially significant public health benefits 
capable of improving societal health.205 Thus, in some ways, these 
products can be thought of as valuable moving targets that are in 
need of more factual learning. As a result, these products and future 
ones like them require a flexible regulatory framework that is capa-
ble of building in adjustment as the facts develop. Striking a middle 
ground between minimizing uncertain public health risks, while at 
the same time not discouraging innovation and industry growth, 
should be the primary goal for regulation. Thus, for officials tasked 
with developing the most effective methods of regulation, perhaps 
this means that they should take calculated risks in the interest of 
promoting innovation as “[i]t is no accident that the most promising 
technological [tobacco] alternative [originally] emerged from an un-
regulated environment.”206 
The safety of our society is improved by the development of po-
tentially “dangerous technologies.”207 Rather than imposing inequi-
table and overly burdensome regulatory regimes that discourage in-
novation and the diffusion of what may be the next significant public 
health benefit, the most effective means of regulation might be to 
embrace calculated risks in the pursuit of innovative technologies 
that advance society. In the final analysis, a products liability theory 
of regulation managed under state tort law that includes specific tar-
get-oriented federal restrictions may provide the most balanced reg-
ulatory framework for creating a habitable environment in which 
new innovations for public health can appropriately flourish. 
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